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Introduction to Volume 2
G. Honor Fagan and Ronaldo Munck
Whatever our perspective on the world around us, we cannot help wondering
whether globalization and the end of the Cold War has actually brought us
greater insecurity, rather than the increased security promised. The processes of
internationalization unleashed by globalization have undermined the once
dominant national security model. But the globalization paradigm has not itself
been too concerned to map out the new global (in) security dilemmas. We have
only rather generalized theories of ‘‘global risk’’ (Beck 1999) and wishful aspira-
tions for a ‘‘global civil society’’ (Kaldor 2003). This general introduction thus
seeks to develop a fruitful encounter between the globalization paradigm and
the new (and old) forms of security and insecurity now becoming manifest
across the world with greater intensity.
The security dilemmas we all face in the post–Cold War era can be dealt
with in various ways. We could just be fatalistic and accept security concerns as
an inevitable part of the human condition read in Hobbesian terms. We could
also seek to mitigate security and risk challenges through amelioration and
conflict containment. Or, finally, as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue we
can pursue a ‘‘transcender logic [which] argues that human society on a global
scale can construct a radically new world order, and in so doing escape the dan-
gers of the past’’ (2008, 18). Whether this view is overly optimistic is a matter of
opinion, but it t least offers a framework to pursue postconflict security strat-
egies. Nor does this view deny that world politics in the twenty-first century
will be characterized by deep uncertainties, growing and unpredictable risks, as
well as generalized turmoil. Indeed, Booth and Wheeler point to how ‘‘the
global agenda will be uniquely dominated by an era of converging global chal-
lenges, with potentially catastrophic global and local impacts’’ (268). There will
be new challenges overlaid on old ones, combining in new and unsettling
modalities. The point is, can we deal with the era of uncertainty and risk by
denying it or hiding from it or simply coping with it, or should we seek to
address its root causes? This encyclopaedia seeks to address the complex cluster
of security challenges in the era of globalization. Our focus is particularly on
what is new, and our lens is a critical one that avoids facile orthodoxies. The
challenges are very serious, and so our thinking must be equally serious and
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focused on a critical understanding of current reality and, wherever possible, on
seeking mechanisms for transcending the security dilemma.
We start this introductory chapter by examining the diverse ways in which
globalization has redefined the nature of security. Security threats are now
increasingly global—from global warming to global hunger, to global terrorism—
and thus the national or statist security paradigm is inadequate. We expand on
this theme in the next section dealing with the simultaneous ‘‘widening’’ of se-
curity (to take on nonmilitary threats) and its ‘‘deepening’’ (to go further than
the nation-state into society). This leads us to a sustained review of the new
human security paradigm seen by its supporters as the replacement for the
national security paradigm and by its detractors as vague and unable to be
operationalized. Turning to more recent dramatic events in world affairs since
2001, we consider the notion that we are entering a new era of permanent war
or permanent security. Finally, we turn to the broader picture of globalization
with its winners and losers and ask whether a global civil society can be con-
structed to take us beyond the current state of seemingly limitless insecurity as
the dominant human condition.
SECURITY
Globalization creates greater economic, political, social, and cultural interactions
across the globe and is thus a source of great dynamism. However, security
analysts argue that ‘‘many different aspects of globalisation now combine to
increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats from weapons prolifer-
ation, cyber attacks, ethnic violence, global crime, drug trafficking, environmen-
tal degradation and the spread of infectious disease’’ (Davis 2003, 1–2). From
this rather wide range of perceived threats, it is clear that two in particular are
at the top of the list. The first is the environment and the cluster of issues under
the label of global warming that clearly pose transnational risks (see Environ-
mental Insecurity entry in volume 1). The second is the issue of global terror-
ism (see Terrorism entry in volume 1) with the likes of Al Qaeda being ‘‘able
effectively to exploit new communications technologies, global financial net-
works, and the ease of movements of people’’ (Davis 2003, 1). Between them
these twin perils are creating great turbulence by posing security threats in a
conventional sense and undermining human security in a broader sense.
Globalization’s security implications have led to a number of attempts at
‘‘redefining security’’ (Mathews 1989). Since the end of the Cold War, a narrow
military conception of national security has now seemed not only redundant
but also inadequate. Jessica Mathews was already arguing in 1989 that ‘‘global
developments now suggest the need for [a] broadening definition of national
security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues’’ (162).
National sovereignty had already been undermined by the increased freedom
of financial flows in the 1980s and by the information and communications tech-
nology revolution (see Internet and Human [In]Security entry). Environmental
strains now clearly transcended national borders. From a global development
perspective, there was a simultaneous move to broaden the definition of
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security, to include economic vulnerability and dependency in the global South
(Thomas 1987). External military threats were seen as less important in the
South than economic vulnerability and state weakness. The issue of external de-
pendence, becoming more accentuated rather than less in the era of globaliza-
tion, is seen as the main context-setting element for the majority of the world’s
population.
Taking a broad overview of the globalization and security field, we note a
fairly general recognition that there are now newsecurity challenges that cannot
be dealt with on the basis of national security or by purely military means. Even
the proponents of traditional military conceptions of security accept a tendency
toward the internationalization of security. Notions of collective security now
come to the fore, whether dealing with global warming or global terrorism. The
old binary opposition between the external (international) and the internal
(national) can no longer be credibly sustained. Crime, drugs, people trafficking,
and terrorism are as much inside as outside the national borders (see Crime
entry). State security is no longer effective even in its own terms, never mind
from the perspective of the many millions across the world for whom their own
state is the main source of insecurity. While state security is clearly an urgent
issue in relation to the real or perceived terrorist threat, as an overall paradigm
it is, we argue, of declining effectiveness.
Whether globalization has increased or diminished global security is not
entirely or easily decidable. Jan Aart Scholte sysematically goes through all the
main issues at stake and finds arguments for and against on all counts (2005,
chap. 9). While global connectivity may disincentive war in the global North,
the increasingly global reach of armed forces has facilitated military interven-
tion in the global South. While global consciousness has promoted ecological
awareness, many global activities are heavily polluting. Globalization’s impact
on security is clearly contradictory across and at all levels. Likewise, while glob-
alization has brought to the fore global threats and the need for transnational
responses, the national security paradigm is far from defunct in practice. As
David Held and others put it, ‘‘The doctrine of national security remains one of
the essential defining principles of modern statehood . . . For if a state does not
have the capacity to secure its territory and protect its people, then its very
raison d’̂etre can be called into question’’ (1999, 145). This verdict is clearly
reflected in the U.S. response to the attack on the symbols of national political,
economic, and military power in September 2001.
Critical security theorists now argue for the need ‘‘to develop a new [secu-
rity] paradigm around the policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict’’
(Rogers 2000, 119). This is a broad agenda indeed, insofar as true global security
would entail a reversal of current socioeconomic polarization, unsustainable
growth patterns, and unbridled global military aggression. While this transfor-
mative view of security in the era of globalization is unlikely to be main-
streamed, there is still a considerable widening of traditional notions of
security. The U.S. National Security Strategy statement of 1994 thus declared
unambiguously that ‘‘not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational
phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation,
rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications’’
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(cited in Hough 2004, 14). The broadening of security from this state perspective
relates to the understanding that soft power can often complement hard power.
It is indeed the rise of soft power that could be seen as the defining characteris-
tic of the era despite the more traditional hard power response to 9/11.
DEEPER SECURITY
The widening security agenda can be seen as simply increasing the state’s
securitization of such issues as migration, health, and food in a way that does
not essentially challenge the traditional security paradigm in its essentials (see
entries for Migration and Health in this volume, and Food Security/Fisheries
in volume 1). But we might ask, what would be the implications of a deeper
conception of security? In 1993 the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
declared paradigmatically that ‘‘the concept of security must change—from an
exclusive stress on national society to a much greater stress on people’s security,
from security through armaments to security through human development,
from territorial to food, employment and environmental security’’ (cited in
Hough 2004, 13). This move by the UN was congruent with its concern to pro-
mote the ‘‘human face’’ of globalization in contrast with the dominant powers’
then-prevalent adherence to free and unrestricted market mechanisms and suc
multilateral economic organizations as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The step was part of the broader move toward a post–
Washington Consensus on economic matters, as it were.
It was not only the soft power approach of the UN, though, that sought to
deepen the traditional concept of security. From the mid-1990s onward, such
nation-states as Canada and Ireland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, also
began, at least rhetorically, to advance the notion of human security (see next
section). Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, consis-
tently argued for human security in the UN and forcefully advocated the crea-
tion of the International Criminal Court. Critics could easily argue that this
move was simply a middle-ranking power’s bid to gain exposure in the interna-
tional arena through a distinctive foreign policy. Furthermore, the policy was
couched in the language of soft power in the sense of the pursuit of state inter-
ests by other means, rather than a pursuit of global interest however that might
be defined. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, it has been noted, ‘‘the
Canadians . . . have been in the forefront of campaigns to ban the use of land
mines, and reform the UN Security Council so that it is less constrained by
power politics’’ (Hough 2004, 14).
In the academic domain there occurred around that same time a parallel
process of deepening of security as a theoretical paradigm. In the early 1980s,
the influential work of Barry Buzan had already begun the process of widening
security, with his People, States and Fear (1983) adding the categories of eco-
nomic, societal, and ecological security to that of military security. It was the
state and not the individual, however, that remained the reference point for se-
curity insofar as the state was seen as the primary agent for the reduction of
insecurity. By the early 1990s, this view proved unsustainable, particularly in
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Europe. With Ole Weaver, Buzan developed the concept of societal security, a
notion that effectively deepened the traditional idea of state security (Buzan,
Weaver, and de Wilde 1998). In post–Cold War Europe, sovereignty was seen
as less important than issues of identity (including culture, religion, and lan-
guage) in societies changing rapidly, not least through the increase of mass
migration. Societies were seen as complex organizations, and the challenges
they faced were conceived of as much more diffuse and less easy to categorize
than were, for example, the traditional security challenges made by other
powers.
The deepening of security through the development of a concept of societal
security was designed, however, not to replace state security but to complement
it. The reconceptualization of security is thus incomplete here. There is here a
reified understanding of identity as an objective given and little understanding
of security as a social construction. Also at play here is an implicit Eurocentrism
insofar as it quite uncritically privileges a Western conception of security and
securitization (of, say, Islam). Above all, the deepening of the security paradigm
by what has become known as the Copenhagen School seems to ignore the gen-
dered nature of security as concept and practice. A gender perspective (see
entry for Gender) entails not just adding new issues (widening), but also genu-
inely reconceptualizing (deepening) security. To understand globalization, con-
flict, and security today we require a gendered approach that can deconstruct
the patriarchal state, unpack the gendered nature of identity, and explore the
links between militarism and patriarchy (see Tickner 2001). Social relations and
processes on a global scale are all inherently gendered, and thus security chal-
lenges affect men and women differently.
From a critical security perspective, the widening and deepening operations
carried out within the mainstream paradigm since the end of the Cold War and
the onset of globalization have clear limits. It has been argued that the events of
2001–2003 (9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have in fact taken us back to the days
when state security reigned supreme—when state security trumped that of the
individual, and state-led military power rendered soft power irrelevant. Still,
Steve Smith makes a strong contrary argument that ‘‘the events of September 11
support those who wish to widen and deepen the concept of security’’ (2006,
57). After all, it was not a state that declared war on the United States but,
rather, a transnational network reflecting a very different conception of identity,
of community, and, indeed, of security itself. What this tells us, of course, is that
security is a conceptual battlefield with no agreed-on definition or parameters.
That security as a concept is itself a contested discourse is hardly surprising
given what is at stake in terms of how we define the problems and the
responses to global security risks.
HUMAN SECURITY
We could argue that the simultaneous widening and deepening of security
comes to a logical conclusion with the concept of human security now seen as a
full-blown alternative to state security. The concept of human security is
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inseparable from the optimistic Western view following the end of the Cold
War, namely, that globalization would lead to democratization and and that
conflict over fundamentals would become a thing of the past (see Geopolitics
entry in volume 1). In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance published
its influential report Our Common Neighbourhood, arguing that ‘‘the concept of
global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of
states, to include the security of people and the security of the planet’’ (338). At
the same time, the concept of human security was coming to the fore in the
work of the UNDP, which launched the human development index (HDI)
focused on the welfare of individuals rather than the economy.
Economic development and military security now became intertwined in the
dominant conceptual discourses (see Development entry in volume 1). The
basic underlying principle seems straightforward enough: ‘‘Since the idea of
human security is to improve the lives of people rather than improve the secu-
rity of national borders and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action
by the international community seems essential’’ (King and Murray 2001–2002,
607). Human security is a move in the realm of security that parallels the
discursive shift in development theory toward sustainable development, and in
international law to human rights as an overarching principle. It is a people-
centered approach to security that seeks to create a situation where all will
enjoy ‘‘freedom from fear and freedom from want.’’ It is assumed to be the rai-
son d’être of the United Nations, and many national governments have adopted
it as a progressive foreign policy slogan.
Recently, considerable effort has been put into developing and operationaliz-
ing the concept of human security (Alkire 2003). Nevertheless, the effort
remainsi quite vulnerable to the charge that ‘‘human security is like ‘sustainable
development’—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it
means’’ (Paris 2004, 250). From the perspective of the national security advisor,
human security looks very much like a laundry list of desirable but utopian
goals; a laudable ideal rather than a relevant policy category. It is also open to
many, often conflicting interpretations. We might, for example, agree that to
bring peace to a region we need to address the root causes of conflict, but then
the remedies suggested might vary hugely. From a traditional state security
perspective, the human security approach can only dilute the analytical power
of security and presents such a vast array of different threats and complex am-
bitious solutions, that nothing gets done.
Beyond its vagueness, the concept of human security can also be interrogated
in terms of its assumed unproblematic notion of human security itself. In 2003,
the Commission of Human Security issued the landmark report Human Security
Now. The report argued that when a state is neither willing nor able to ensure
the human security of its citizens, ‘‘the principle of [international] non-interfer-
ence yields to the international responsibility to protect’’ (Commission of
Human Security 2003, ix). States or the state systems are still expected to ensure
human security by intervening where ‘‘fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or gener-
ally chaotic state entities’’ (p. 8) do not protect human security. This approach
enlists the concept of human security in a radical way to support the global
governance agenda. As Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell put it, ‘‘Human
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Security Now argues for a bio-politics of human population based upon global
forms of coordination and centralisation . . . collectively having the ability and
legitimacy to support the efforts of weak and ineffective states’’ (2006, 15). In
other words, human security can be yet another form of human control.
From this perspective, the resilience of global populations can be improved
through regulatory networks, including aid programs, to ensure biopolitical reg-
ulation. This critique of the concept of human security as a form of biopolitical
regulation draws on the work of Michel Foucault. Biopolitics and biopower can
be seen as the appropriate regulatory mechanism for the era of global gover-
nance. As Foucault put it, ‘‘Regulatory mechanisms must be established to
establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis . . .
security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent
in a population of living beings, so as to optimise a state of life’’ (2003, 246).
Human security is ultimately about the security of the modern state. It is a
hugely ambitious project to establish through biopower a disciplinary power
over the human-as-species. In this sense, it is complementary to, rather than a
radical alternative to, traditional conceptions of state security.
PERMANENT SECURITY
The benign version of human security did ultimately come to pass, however, as
the optimistic global security mood of the 1990s gave way to the post-2001
moves toward what we might call an enhanced permanent security state. The
modern ‘‘state of emergency’’ emerges when a state declares that military meth-
ods are necessary to deal with disorder that cannot be dealt with by normal po-
litical means. The panoply of counterterrorism measures declared by the
president of the United States of America after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon have been wide-ranging and designed to last. As Mi-
chael Dillon argues, ‘‘On September 11th, 2001, the United States found itself
subject to the recoil of the violence of globalisation. Declaring war on the terror
to which New York had been subjected, the Bush administration invoked a
global state of emergency to wage indefinite war on an indefinite enemy. The
outcome has been a radical suspension of the law to save the law’’ (2002, 77).
The logic of modern power is articulated most clearly by Giorgio Aganben
(2005), who argues that the ‘‘state of exception,’’ which was once a provisional
measure in the West, has now become a working paradigm for government.
Globalization and security set the parameters of events prior to and since
2001. One asymmetric attack by a relatively small organization is clearly not the
cause of this transformation in world affairs. Nor can it explain how or why an
emergency extrapolitical regime has now become the new normalcy. The tradi-
tional divide between war and peace has now disappeared as the world
embarks on a long war (see Information Wars and New Wars entries in volume
1). President George W. Bush declared, ‘‘Our war on terror begins with Al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’’ (cited in Gross 2006, 75).
The global War on Terror declared in 2001 has since transmuted in White
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House and Pentagon discourse into the ‘‘Long War.’’ The change in terminology
reflects a growing recognition that one cannot declare war on a form of war.
But there is still no recognition that this Long War cannot be won by military
means. As John Arquilla puts it, ‘‘In terms of the Long War thus far, and in
what is likely to come, ideas and beliefs have, in important ways, begun to
trump traditional war-fighting’’ (2007, 384).
The Long War, like the Cold War before it, seeks a clearly identifiable enemy
that fits conventional geopolitical and military thinking (see M€unkler 2005 for
an overview). It does not respond to the complex array of factors creating global
insecurity but, in fact, adds to them. It is not even sustainable security in con-
ventional terms: ‘‘The current U.S. security paradigm is essentially one of ‘con-
trol’—a matter of responding to current and potential threats primarily by the
use of military force’’ (Rogers 2007, 136). This exposes the severe limitations in
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that was meant to transform U.S.
military strategy after the Cold War ended. The use of weapons, high technol-
ogy, and information and communications technology would put an end to war
as we know it (Hirst 2001). The American way of life was now joined by an
American way of war. But the RMA was disrupted by the asymmetric attacks
of 2001 and their global dissemination by global information and communica-
tions technology.
The RMA and the Long War are of dubious efficacy as security drivers even
in their own terms because they rest on an outdated modernization theory
perspective on development—on the notion of regime change, for example—
and on a technological determinism that ignores the social, political, and cul-
tural determinants of conflict. More specifically, by demonizing the likes of Al
Qaeda, the dominant security discourses cannot comprehend its nature. A quite
different approach would be to examine this type of organization in terms of
social movement theory and as part of global civil society. Victor Asal and his
colleagues make a coherent argument that such organizations as Al Qaeda can
be viewed as ‘‘transnational advocacy networks,’’ a theoretical approach mainly
applied to human rights movements (2007). After all, Al Qaeda has embraced a
localized and networked form of organization, and like humanitarian networks,
it is alert to the importance of symbolic political action. It also works on public
opinion through an adept use of the new communications technology.
The notion of a Long War against Islam as a consequence of an underlying
clash of civilizations is based on no clear historical understanding of the rela-
tionship between globalization and war (on which see Barkani 2006). That glob-
alization meant peace and that war was now a thing of the past was an illusion
of the 1990s and reflected the era’s ‘‘end of history’’ mood (Fukuyama 1992). It
is not so much that globalization itself causes war but that we need an under-
standing of how ‘‘war is itself a form of interconnection, and a historically perva-
sive and significant one at that. War in this sense is a globalizing force, and it
has been for a long time’’ (Barkani 2006, xii). We can then go on to explore how
the West and Islam are interconnected and have a mutual constitution. The
modernity and hybridity of a movement such as Al Qaeda precludes any
simplistic model based on Islamic fundamentalism and shows how the Long
War on Terror is a recipe only for the deepening and broadening of insecurity.
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BEYOND SECURITY?
We argue that to understand and deal with the issue of (in)security in the era of
globalization, we need to move beyond the security paradigms explored in this
introduction. The various theoretical approaches to security—from realism
through poststructuralism—are also constantly constructing the political mean-
ing of (in)security. We have examined in particular the broadening and deepen-
ing of the security problematic and the highly ambiguous concept of human
security, seen by some as liberal wishful thinking and by others as a Foucaul-
tian control mechanism. What Booth advocates, from the perspective of the new
critical security studies, is not just to turna all political problems into security
issues (‘‘securitising politics’’) but to ‘‘turn every security issue into a question
of political theory (what might be called politicising security)’’ (2005, 14). Secu-
rity is too important to all of us to be left to the so-called securocrats or, for that
matter, to the academic specialists in security studies.
Clearly, from a globalization perspective, security cannot be divorced from
the global political economy. Security and insecurity issues do not arise in ster-
ile apolitical environments or as part of some military strategist’s abstract sce-
nario planning. To a large extent, the political economy of globalization dictates
life chances, affecting whether we lead comfortable lives or suffer social exclu-
sion (Munck 2005). As Roger Tooze argues, ‘‘It is the apparently increasingly
arbitrary, random, sudden and unpredictable nature of the workings of the
global economy that have heightened the sense that these matters concern our
security’’ (2005, 143). We could go further to argue that the currently dominant
neoliberal market-friendly globalization not only generates but even depends
on insecurity. Competitiveness—which applies as much between people, com-
munities, cities, nation-states, and regions as between enterprises—is explicitly
creating insecurity and rejecting any notion of social protection or solidarity.
Neither can we approach security in a global context without clearly under-
standing the complexity and tensions in the real world. Certainly, globalization
did not do away with what are mistakenly seen as premodern forms of conflict
derived from racial, ethnic, tribal, or national identities. Paul James (2006)
directs our attention to the complexities and contradictions that structure peo-
ple’s lives and social relationships in the era of globalization. There is not an
abstract contest between globalization (good) and tribalism (bad) as many pro-
ponents of globalization have argued. James develops instead a counterposition
‘‘that allows us to make decisions about political-ethical directions, on the basis
of an understanding about the complexities of different forms of community
and polity, rather than on the basis of ideologically-driven prejudice about the
essential virtues of savage globalisation’’ (2006, 9).
One seemingly attractive response to global insecurity would be to foster the
development of a global civil society (see Global Civil Society entry), which
would counter the state and other forms of violence and insecurity. Such a soci-
ety is defined as ‘‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, net-
works and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and
operating beyond the confines of national societies, politics and economies’’
(Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001, 17). This broad definition would embrace
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many forms of globalization-contesting movements throughout the world,
including Al Qaeda. But the proponents of global civil society clearly do not
wish to see global terrorism, or global crime, for that matter, included in their
cosmopolitan sphere of civilized dialogue. Indeed, they have gone so far as sup-
porting wars they deemed humanitarian, such wars, for example, as the bomb-
ing of Serbia by NATO forces in 1999.
Whether there can be such a thing as a humanitarian war goes to the heart of
the relationship between globalization and security. For Mary Kaldor and others,
the nature of the new wars—where criminalism and tribalism prevail—necessi-
tates a cosmopolitan response that will likely include military force (2003). Like-
wise sympathetic to the view that outside agencies should intervene when a state
cannot save its own citizens from violence, Iris Marion Young also argues that
she finds it ‘‘disturbing that some international actors appear to assume that such
commitments to human rights themselves legitimate some states making war on
others’’ (2007, 100). The contradictions between the notion of humanitarian wars
and the specter of human rights imperialism point us to the main limitation of
global civil society theory, namely, that it fails to address and understand the na-
ture of contemporary postmodern violence (Delanty 2001).
To effectively go beyond even critical security studies (see Fierke 2007 for an
overview), we need to start with the so-called theory-practice nexus. We must
accept that theory is ‘‘for some one and for some purpose,’’ as Robert Cox
famously put it. An emancipatory theory would need to explore the sources of
human insecurity over and above the challenges to state security. There is today a
global anxiety, or what Bauman calls ‘‘liquid fear’’ (2006), that permeates all
areas of our life, creating insecurity around many of the facets of globalization
and not just the new global terror that the security literature concentrates on.
There are regressive structures and processes in today’s global society that
clearly create ever greater insecurity. These range from inequitable trade
arrangements and unjust wars to polluting, sexist, and racist daily social prac-
tices. There are also progressive structures and processes striving to knit to-
gether the local communities and global networks in pursuit of a better life for
all. Certainly a gap exists here, as Richard Wyn Jones argues, because ‘‘interna-
tional relations specialists on the whole have been remarkably ineffective on the
relationship between their work – their theories—and political practice . . . There
have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can
help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar
room or conference hotel’’ (1999, xx). To once again marry a critical understand-
ing of the world around us with the enduring human capacity to imagine and
construct a better life would indeed be a task worth developing to ensure that
the era of globalization does not become the era of insecurity it threatens to be.
GLOBALIZATION
Globalization—variously defined or not at all—is the obligatory point of reference
for any discussion of contemporary economic, political, social, and cultural trans-
formation including the critical issue of security and insecurity. Globalization is,
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in short, the new matrix for our era, the framework for what is and for what
might be. The next section of this introductory chapter examines the contested
and often contradictory meanings that globalization takes on as dominant para-
digm for our time. This is followed by a summary of the main economic trans-
formations globalization has generated in the world around us. How this new
world order might be governed politically is the subject of the final section that
sets the parameters for many of the contributions to this volume.
Globalization is currently the dominant paradigm or way of seeing the world
around us, both for supporters of this phenomenon and for its detractors. It is a
grand narrative as powerful, all-embracing, and visionary as any that may have
preceded it, including those of classical capitalism, colonialism, or socialism. It is
seen as an epoch-making moment in human history, a transition to a brave new
world whether that is viewed positively or negatively. Recently, substantive and
seriously researched books have been published arguing for ‘‘the truth about
globalization’’ (Legrain 2004) or ‘‘in defence of globalization’’ (Bhagwati 2004)
and on ‘‘why globalization works’’ (Wolf 2004). These works are as passionate
and as important as those seeking to defend an earlier model of capitalism from
the ideological challenge posed by the rise of the Soviet planned economy in the
1920s. So, what is the neoliberal case for a global market economy?
For the liberal globalizers, the essence of the phenomenon in question is the
free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor ‘‘so that, economically
speaking, there are no foreigners’’ (Wolf 2004, 14). They believe, quite literally,
in the ‘‘magic of the market,’’ a market they see as not only the source of mate-
rial wealth but ‘‘also the basis of freedom and democracy’’ (Wolf 2004, 57). Lib-
eral globalization is seen as something that encourages moral virtues. While it
indeed ‘‘makes people richer,’’ it also, according to Martin Wolf, makes people
‘‘more concerned about environmental damage, pain and injustice’’ (2004, 57).
Be that as it may, clearly the liberal globalizer worldview goes beyond simple
economics and offers an alternative to all collectivist or social views of the
world. Corporations are seen as virtuous as well as dynamic agents of progres-
sive change. Globalization will, according to this view, lead to a decline of in-
equality and poverty worldwide as the market works its magic. While it might
have some downsides—it is accepted that no market is perfect—overall there is
simply no alternative. Freedom itself – variously defined or not at all—depends
on the continued expansion of the global free market.
The case against globalization is equally passionate and categorical. Global-
ization, from this perspective, is seen as an economic process leading to the
commodification of life itself. There is nothing that is not for sale, from health
to education, from knowledge to our genes. Behind the rhetoric of free trade
supposedly lies a sinister move toward introducing barriers around privatized
technology, resources, and knowledge to keep them safe for capitalist exploita-
tion. The result, as Naomi Klein puts it, is that ‘‘globalization is now on trial
because on the other side of all these virtual fences are real people, shut out of
schools, workplaces, their own farms, homes and communities’’ (2002, xxi). The
‘‘silent takeover’’ (Hertz 2001) by the transnational corporations (see Transna-
tional Corporations entry in volume 1) is seen by others to be an imminent
threat to the very possibility of Western democracy as we have known it
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(see Democracy entry in volume 1). Corporations are taking over social functions
previously carried out by the state, pressuring governments to follow their neo-
liberal global agenda, and leaving the political system devoid of any real choices.
It is probably impossible to adjudicate between the pro- and antiglobaliza-
tion cases, especially when stated in such a polemical and absolutist manner. It
might, anyway, be more productive to avoid such binary opposition and
instead start from an assumption around the sheer complexity of the globaliza-
tion processes. As John Urry puts it, ‘‘Global ordering is so immensely compli-
cated that it cannot be ‘known’ through a simple concept or set of processes’’
(2003, 15). The global era cannot be reduced to a simple logic of the market, or of
so-called network society or of empire. The complexity approach allows us to
move beyond such counterpositions as those between structural determinism and
pure chance or, put another way, between frozen stability and ever-changingness
as dominant trends. Complexity refuses all static and reductionist readings of
globalization that should, in preference, be seen as ‘‘neither unified nor . . . act[-
ing] as a subject nor should it be conceived of in linear fashion’’ (Urry 2003, 40).
It is understandable that first-generation globalization studies should have con-
ceived of this complex process as more powerful and unified than it actually
was, but from now on an approach that foregrounds the complexity approach
will be more productive whatever political choices we ultimately make.
Another common opposition in the vast literature on globalization now
available is between those who stress the novelty of the situation and those who
stress continuity with earlier periods of capitalism’s internationalization.
Among the popularizers of the first position must be counted management con-
sultant Kenichi Ohmae, who in a series of books with such titles as The Border-
less World (1990) and The End of the Nation State (1995) articulated a vision of
modernity’s nation-state era coming to an end as the liberating forces of the
global market became dominant in the 1990s. The traditional order of national
economies, industrial production, welfare states, and so on, would be swept
away by the new wind of free market dynamism. Ohmae stresses the revolu-
tionary break with the past and the short time span, say, of 25 years, in which
these world revolutionary events took place.
Academic promoters of the globalist case are more nuanced; nevertheless,
emphasis is laid very much on the novelty of the phenomenon described. Thus
Anthony Giddens finds himself essentially agreeing with those for whom ‘‘the
new communications technologies, the role of knowledge as a factor of produc-
tion, and the new discoveries in the life sciences, signal a profound transition in
human history’’ (2001, 4). The whole mood or tone of this discourse is revolu-
tionary in that it conceptualizes globalization as a fundamental shift in the
human trajectory that is now in full flow. There are, of course, optimistic and
pessimistic renderings of the globalizing scenario, but the unifying strand is that
the shifts involved in all areas of human life are irreversible and of global signif-
icance, whether we view them as benign or not.
Against the globalizers, who believe in globalization, and the antiglobalizers
who believe it is real too, even if they do not like its effects, we can posit the
sceptics, for whom the death of the traditional order is at best overstated. None
are clearer or more evidence based than the arguments of Paul Hirst and
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Grahame Thompson in their aptly titled Globalization in Question (1999), which
challenges what they call the ‘‘necessary myth’’ that globalization represents a
qualitatively new stage of capitalist development. For these authors, the global-
ization of production has been exaggerated, as have the forecasts of the death of
the nation-state. While accepting that there is a growing international economy,
they reject as fanciful the idea that multi- or transnational corporations are foot-
loose and fancy-free. They even turn the tables on the decline-of-the-nation-state
arguments by showing how in many ways the nation-state has gained in impor-
tance by managing or governing the processes of internationalization. While
arguably marked by a tinge of nostalgia for a preglobalization era when so-
called normal national politics prevailed, this approach is a healthy sceptical
antidote to out-and-out globalizers.
Globalization today certainly shows many new traits, but one can also discern
continuities with previous expansionary phases of capitalism. One way of putting
it, albeit allegorically, is that ‘‘one-third of the globalization narrative is over-sold;
one-third we do not understand; and one-third is radically new’’ (Drache 1999, 7).
From a complexity theory standpoint, we might challenge this separation
between being and becoming, but the drift of the argument is well taken. There
is a big difference between globalization as mutually reinforcing and causally
related transformations following a preestablished path, and a conception based
on the notion of ‘‘contingently related tendencies’’ (Dicken, Peck, and Tickell
1997, 161). There are also extremely diverse economic, political, social, and cul-
tural tendencies that vary widely across regions and time. There is simply no
unified coherent and unilinear globalization strategy waiting to be applied com-
parable to the 1950s modernization theory, which for that era served as a widely
accepted overarching paradigm for social change (see Development entry in
volume 1). Now occurring around us all the time is a complex restructuring and
recomposition of the world order, an order the concept of globalization might
point toward in different ways and even partially explain, but the concept
cannot serve as master framework to understand and explain it totally.
Having briefly analyzed what globalization is not, what can we say about
what it is over and beyond the obvious complexity and uneven development of
the phenomenon? Clearly, it is no one thing and has various interlinked eco-
nomic, political, ideological, social, and cultural facets. But if there is one over-
arching theme, it is that of connectivity or interconnectedness. Following Ash
Amin, we could argue that ‘‘the most distinctive aspect of contemporary global-
ization’’ is the ‘‘interconnectedness, multiplexity and hybridization of social life
at every level’’ (1997, 129). This means we can no longer draw clear and firm
boundaries between local and global spheres or between national and interna-
tional spheres of social life. We cannot separate the ‘‘in here’’ of the city, com-
munity, or locality in which we live from the ‘‘out there’’ of global flows of
money, capital, people, power, and dominance. Thus globalization should be
seen not as an entity but, rather, as a set of complex interacting relationships.
Our daily activities are all influenced by these complex and interrelated facets
that are stretching our social relationships to an unprecedented degree.
Another useful image to understand globalization is that of time-space com-
pression. Spatial barriers—for example, in trade or communications—have
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fallen away to a considerable degree. Space does not even matter any more,
according to some pundits. Time has also changed from being a reflection of
natural processes to become instantaneous. The world has been shrinking for a
long time, but this process has taken a qualitative leap forward in the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century. We may not yet have achieved the distanceless
world that Martin Heidegger once foretold, but as David Harvey puts it, we are
now living through ‘‘processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of
space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways,
how we represent the world to ourselves’’ (1989, 240). The elimination of spatial
barriers and the compression of time will not, however, necessarily lead to a ho-
mogeneous spatial development. The changing spatiality of global capitalism is,
if anything, more heterogeneous, differentiated, and fragmented (see two
entries under Regionalism in volume 1).
Above all else, we must stress that globalization signifies a much greater
interconnectedness of social fates. As David Held and Anthony McGrew put it,
‘‘Globalization weaves together, in highly complex and abstract systems, the
fates of households, communities and peoples in distant regions of the globe’’
(2003, 129). Our own daily lives are becoming increasingly globalized in terms
of their references points, our consumption patterns, and our mental maps. We
imagine the world in a different way than our ancestors did at the last turn of
the century. Today for many individuals and collective subjects, be they govern-
ments, companies, intellectuals, artists, or citizens, globalization is the ‘‘imag-
ined horizon’’ (Garcia Canclini 1999, 32). The repercussions, both positive and
negative, of the 2004 New Year’s Eve East Asian tsunami demonstrated most
clearly how real the weaving together of fates across the world now is. Which-
ever view is taken, clearly globalization has transformed the world around us
and the way in which we understand it and seek to change it.
So in terms of competing paradigms, it might be premature to choose one
particular rendition of globalization theory to guide us. Held and his colleagues
usefully distinguish between the globalizers, the sceptics (who doubt there is
much new in it), and the transformationalists. The latter stress the changes tak-
ing place and how an open-ended explanation of this arena may help us in get-
ting to know the one-third of globalization that is as yet unknown. As against
fixed ideal-type paradigms of a new global market, global democracy, or global
civilization, Held and his colleagues prefer the ‘‘transformationalist accounts
[that] emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process which is
inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural
factors’’ (1999, 7). A good example of the latter are the events of September 11,
2001, in the United States and their sequel of unfolding conflicts across the
world that effectively put an end to prevailing optimistic views of globalization
as a new peaceful era of harmonious global development.
A transformationalist approach to globalization starts from the premise that
the world is changing rapidly and in fundamental ways, even if the direction of
change is not yet fully discernible. An underlying question is whether a new
sense of globality means we should abandon methodological nationalism, that
is, the nation-state as an obvious and self-sufficient frame of reference for
understanding the changing worlds we live in. A closely associated issue is the
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viability of methodological nationalism, that is, the forms of social enquiry that
precede the rise of supraterritoriality (e.g., the Internet and global financial
markets). While accepting that a new global optic is necessary to comprehend
the changing worlds around us, we cannot accept that the nation-state does not
matter or that territorial forms of consciousness might not have a continuing or
even increasing relevance. The point is, simply, that we now live in the era of
globalization, immersed in a rapidly changing world that clearly has an impact
on all the facets and levels of our lives.
GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIETY
The social facets of globalization are myriad, from transnational migration (see
entry on Migration) to the rise of the global city (see entry on City and the
Self), from new forms of community to the flourishing of global crime (see
entry on Crime). Clearly, the social has become more interconnected, less con-
strained by boundaries or limits. The social world is more interlinked; for many
individuals, social relationships are less limited than they once were. Social
identities are no longer space bound, and geographical distance sets few limits
on social interaction. For Amin, we are witnessing a ‘‘greater hybridization and
perforation of social, economic and political life’’ as a result of the increasing
‘‘interdependence and intermingling of global, distant and local logics’’ (1997,
133). There is no global without its myriad locals, a principle as important as
the constraining of local development by globalization. But it is the heterogene-
ity, the hybridity, and the perforation of all hitherto self-contained domains that
is crucial to an understanding of society in the era of globalization.
Social relations are today constructed as much in space as in particular pla-
ces. The various discourses of globalization construct social subjectivities in a
complex and contradictory fashion. We are no longer place bound, and our
social links can be transnational and they can be virtual. Globalization opens up
to social groups diverse forms of social organization from the local to the re-
gional, the national to the transnational. There is an increased differentiation
and fragmentation of social subjectivity and social consciousness formation.
Globalization has brought to the fore ‘‘the issue of subjectivity, the positions,
agencies and forms of consciousness in and through which identities, decisions,
choices and interventions are produced and enacted’’ (Kayatekin and Ruccio,
1998, 76). What globalization cannot produce is a totalizing vision that explains
all or even determines what happens in the social and cultural domains. It does,
however, produce new horizons of possibilities for all social groupings, be they
the new global elite or the subaltern classes.
The economic and political transformations associated with the development
of globalization are having huge social impacts. This section examines, in very
broad outline, some of the main impacts globalization has on people. The
degree of equality or inequality (see entry on Inequality) within and among
nation-states is today the main issue at stake when the future prospects of glob-
alization are discussed. As G€oran Therborn puts it, ‘‘To the extent that it is
actually operating, globalization puts on the agenda equality and inequality for
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the whole of humankind’’ (2000, 34). For the advocates of globalization, this is a
process in which market mechanisms not only will create abundance for all but
also will eventually even iron out socioeconomic inequalities. For its critics,
globalization is simply the most dynamic machine ever created to foster ever-
growing levels of inequality. So the great riches generated by financial specula-
tion, for example, are necessarily matched by vast layers of people falling
through the very thin safety nets of welfare provision (see entries on Welfare
and Health). Whatever our own opinions, we should note the conclusion of the
recent World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization: ‘‘It is thus
widely accepted that the litmus test for the current process of globalization is
whether it will significantly enhance the speeding up of development and the
reduction of absolute poverty in the world’’ (2003, no. 172, 42).
According to the World Bank, the ‘‘24 developing countries that increased
their integration into the world economy over two decades ending in the late
1990s achieved higher growth in incomes, longer life expectancy, and better
schooling’’ (2002, 1). Those that did not ‘‘integrate’’ into the global economy—
such as the ex-USSR and sub-Saharan Africa—have suffered accordingly, with
poverty rising rapidly. While the World Bank does recognize that the type or
form of integration is crucial to a beneficial social outcome, such other organiza-
tions as the IMF and the WTO put very few provisos on their optimistic mes-
sage. Thus, more or less at random, we can take as representative the view of
Global Envision, a pro-globalization pressure group, which ‘‘takes the global
free market as the starting point for reducing world poverty’’ and declares,
‘‘Providing the poor with opportunities to improve their own lives is the cata-
lyst for creating a more fair, hopeful, and stable future. We support economic
development and responsible free markets as the most reliable and sustainable
strategies for global poverty alleviation’’ (Global Envision Web site). This is not
a view that allows for caveats or for the possibility that the road to globalization
is not equally beneficial for all countries.
The optimistic view of globalization, however, can be countered with other
data from official sources. The UNDP found that at the turn of the century the
assets of the 200 richest people in the world were greater than the combined
incomes of the poorest 40 percent of the world’s population (1999, 20). Another
way of looking at global inequality is to note that the richest 5 percent of the
world’s population receive 83 percent of the world’s income, whereas the
world’s poorest 10 percent receive only 1.4 percent of the world’s total income
(see entries on Inequality and on Social Exclusion). Such a staggering level of
divergence between the winners and the losers in a process of economic devel-
opment is surely unprecedented.
Another way of describing increasing global inequality is in terms of the
Gini coefficient (a rather basic measure where 0 represents equality and 1 in-
equality). According to World Bank data, the Gini coefficient increased from
.62 in 1988 to .66 in 1993. This may not sound like a dramatic increase, but it
actually represents a faster increase in income inequality than that which
occurred in the 1980s in the United States under the Reagan administration
and the United Kingdom under the Thatcher regime, when neoliberalism was
at its height.
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The second major social effect, after inequality, generated by globalization is
interconnectedness. Amin goes so far as to say that ‘‘perhaps the most distinc-
tive aspect of contemporary globalization’’ is precisely the ‘‘interconnectedness,
multiplexity and hybridization, of social life at every level’’ (1997, 129). From
this perspective, territorial ideas of local, regional, national, and international
levels are replaced by a relational theoretical framework. The world, in brief, is
becoming much more interdependent in both a lateral sense, across space, and
in a vertical sense, across levels of society and politics. We can no longer work
with a notion that people live ‘‘in here’’ in their towns, villages, or cities while
globalization happens ‘‘out there’’ in a separate ‘‘global’’ sphere. Rather, the
global can only work through the local level or levels that make it up and make
it effective. The multiple levels or scales of society are all linked through
the various processes (economic, political, social, and cultural) of globalization.
Life in today’s big cities exemplifies the interconnectedness of local and
global social relationships and the complex multiplicity of scales that citizens
structure their lives around (see entry on City and the Self). There is no longer
a clear-cut and simple sense of community bounded by the space of a neighbor-
hood or district alone. In a study entitled Living the Global City, John Eade (1997)
showed the diverse ways in which globalization had affected the residents who
were of diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, had different lifestyles, and had
distinctive perceptions and expectations. Rather than sharing as a community in
a common local culture, the residents related to various global cultures with
which they maintained a regular interaction. As Martin Albrow concludes,
‘‘People can reside in one place and have their meaningful social relations
almost entirely outside it and across the globe’’ (1997, 53). The locality is still a
site for meaningful social activities of all sorts, but it can no longer be divorced
from the ‘‘out there’’ (but also ‘‘in here’’) of globality. The concept of hybridity
captures well the complexity of social relationships in the era of globalization.
Identities are less likely to be fixed, authentic, and simple, as in the essentialist
conception that once prevailed. Rather, identity becomes more fragmented and
fluid in a relational dialogue with others.
We now see a multiplicity of identities based on nationality, age, gender (see
entry on Gender), sexual orientation, race and ethnicity (see entry on Race and
Ethnicity), type of work, place of residence, and so on. In short, our social rela-
tionships are hybrids, no longer pure, and our identities may also be conceived
of in that same way. We may well refuse binary oppositions—colonizer or
colonized, male or female, urban or rural—and instead take up liminal posi-
tions, that is to say, ‘‘betwixt and between’’ fixed poles. The notion of border
crossing captures well the increased spatial mobility of our era but also the
greater social fluidity that characterizes it. From a hybridity perspective we can
no longer neatly categorize people, as in the heyday of modernism, and it thus
complicates our analysis of society and its contradictions.
The world is thus both more unequal and more interconnected than it was
20 years ago, but there is also more movement. Globalization, if it represents
anything at all, would be the greatly accelerated movement of goods, capital,
and people since around 1980. Transportation has become cheaper and faster,
oiling the wheels of trading. This has led some commentators to predict the
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‘‘death of distance’’ as such new forms of transportation as air freight and
containerization facilitate international trade. The new information economy
can practically avoid transportation costs altogether. We are moving from a
world of structures and barriers to one based on networks and global flows.
Whether it is information, money, goods, people, or hazards, we are now seeing
global fluids that are escaping the lenses of traditional social science concepts
that were based firmly on the parameters of the bounded nation-state.
The movement not only of goods but also of capital has increased signifi-
cantly through globalization. Capital flows to the developing countries of the
global South increased from less than $28 billion in the 1970s to around $306
billion m 1997 (World Bank 2002, 42). Of course, this flow of capital was
unevenly distributed, with the larger countries of Latin America, China, India,
Malaysia, and Thailand receiving the lion’s share. While the flow of FDI
increased steadily throughout the 1990s, its impact on developing countries was
still less than had been the case during the first wave of globalization. Thus, by
the end of the 1990s, foreign capital represented 22 percent of total developing
countries’ GDP (gross domestic product), nearly double the figure for the l970s
but still beneath the 32 percent reached in 1914 (Maddison 2001, 35). And FDI
in the South is still only a quite small proportion of the global capital market,
which is focused mainly in the global North.
The movement of people from one country to another has also increased sig-
nificantly since 1980 (see entry on Migration). It is well to recall, though, that
during the first wave of globalization (1870–1914), around 10 percent of the
world’s population moved permanently. Today, it is estimated that around 120
million people (2 percent of the world’s population) live in a country other than
the one in which they were born (World Bank 2002, 44). A major impetus
behind the movement of people is clearly the difference in wages between the
economic North and the South. But if the causes of migration are largely eco-
nomic, its effects are social, political, and cultural. For some observers, interna-
tional migration is positive insofar as it may undermine national chauvinism
and promote cultural diversity. But we must also bear in mind the somber con-
clusion of Stephen Castles and Mark Miller: ‘‘Never before has international
migration seemed so connected to conflict and disorder on a global scale’’
(1993, 260). Many more people are now on the move across the world, but it is
also a period when migrants are subject to securitization as potential security
threats. Naturally enough this increases the insecurity of the average economic
migrant.
Finally, there is a widespread image of the social dimension of globalization
that we need to correct, namely, a conception of the global as dynamic and fluid
as contrasted to local, which is seen as static and tradition bound. From this
powerful image Manuel Castells derives the notion that corporations and peo-
ple live in different places and times: one exists in the space of flows and lives
in the instant time of computerized networks, whereas the rest of us exist in the
‘‘space of places’’ and live by the clock time of everyday life (1996, 475). While
this image certainly reflects a tendency in the social transformation unleashed
by globalization, it may be too one-sided. For one, globalization is not some-
thing out there, a nebula hovering above the local. Rather, what we have been
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describing as globalization is constructed, legitimized, and reproduced in local
and national places. Space and place are not separate in this sense. What this
means is that globalization is confronted daily everywhere. Individuals, social
movements (see entry on Social Movements), organizations, and social net-
works all have agency and are not powerless in front of a supposed globaliza-
tion juggernaut. For every door that globalization has closed for social
transformation—for example in reducing the scope of the nation-state—it has
opened others, not least in terms of the new global networked order’s vulner-
ability to disruption through system instability as well as social contestation.
GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE
As to the cultural domain, it might well have been our starting point, such is
the importance of what is called ‘‘global culture’’ in the making of globalization
(see entry on Global Civil Society). As Held and his colleagues put it:
Few expressions of globalization are so visible, widespread and pervasive
as the worldwide proliferation of internationally traded consumer brands,
the global ascendancy of popular cultural icons and artefacts, and the
simultaneous communication of events by satellite broadcasts to hundreds
of millions of people at a time on all continents. (1999, 327)
The simultaneity and ubiquity of global cultural products and processes is,
indeed, a major feature of the era. The commodification of culture along with
every other facet of human life, including life itself, is a key driver of the free
market expansion lying at the core of globalization. If globalization is made at
the cultural level, it is also contested at the discursive level, where different
understandings of and meanings of globalization clash (see entry on Counter-
globalization Movements).
Early debates in this area focused around whether a global culture was
indeed emerging and if it was, whether it would flatten national or indigenous
cultures (see entry on Indigenous Peoples). It is now widely accepted that not-
withstanding the rise of a global consumer culture and a global youth culture,
cultural diversity and hybridization will prevail over any ‘‘Coca-Cola-ization’’
or ‘‘Americanization’’ of the world’s cultures. For Mike Featherstone, the era of
postmodern globalization has ‘‘pointed to the problem of cultural complexity
and the increasing salience of culture in social life through the greater produc-
tion, mixing and syncretism of cultures which were formerly held separate and
firmly attached to social relationships’’ (1995, 12). Global differences have been
acculturated and ‘‘brought home’’ through increased travel and migration. New
forms of cultural resistance are emerging, and there is even a return to the con-
cept of cultural imperialism that had prevailed during the anticolonial revolu-
tion and the cultural revolt of the 1960s.
Living as we do in the Information Age as part of the knowledge society, it
is clear to us that the cultural domain will play a key role in the making of glob-
alization (see entry on Education). Indeed, some analysts argue that the cultural
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dimension is critical in creating and understanding what globalization is. We
cannot conceive of globalization without the Internet (see entry on Internet)
and the whole information and communications technology (ICT) revolution
that preceded it. There is also considerable evidence that consumerism, once
supposedly strictly a Western phenomenon, is now a global one driving further
economic internationalization to feed consumer demands. The global market for
branded products—from clothes to computer games, from Coca-Cola to small
arms—is continuously expanding the reach of the global market (see entry on
Consumerism). Global connectivity, which is one of the main features of what
we call globalization, is particularly marked in the cultural domain where our
ideas are shaped. But are we moving toward a global culture, as some defend-
ers and critics of globalization alike have been arguing?
There are two basic camps regarding whether a global culture is now emerg-
ing. On the one hand is the cultural homogenization camp, which argues that
cultural flows today are overwhelmingly from the West outward. According to
this argument, that outward flow inevitably leads to the cultural Westernization
of the globe. As Tony Schirato and Jen Webb put it, ‘‘In this perspective, global
culture means Western culture writ large. For those without the resources to
resist this cultural neo-colonialism, the future is Western’’ (2003, 155). Following
this logic, local cultures are doomed to disappear as the Western cultural jug-
gernaut makes its way across the world. The power of the new global media
(e.g., CNN) is seen as destroying local cultural particularities (see entry on
Media, Public Diplomacy, and Security). Authentic local cultures are either
subsumed by this process or, at best, are repackaged as exotic cultural locations
for the discerning Western tourist. Global culture, from this perspective, is a
somewhat artificial production of globalization.
An alternative view of how globalization affects culture is offered by the cul-
tural hybridization approach. Basically, this view posits a two-way cultural
interaction between the global and the local, rather than the one-way flow from
the West to the rest of the world. A hybrid cultural form is thus likely to
ensue—part global, modern, and imported, as well as part local, traditional,
and indigenous. New communication technologies may, for example, spread
the dominance of English as a lingua franca, but they may also reenergize eth-
nic communities across the globe, producing a denser communication and iden-
tification between its far-spread members. While old cultural forms may indeed
be swept away, they may also reform as new cultural products and ‘‘go global’’
as, for example, in relation to the diverse forms of world music. Traditional
crafts and culture may no longer be authentic in the sense of belonging in a
self-contained world, but they have now become part of a global set of flows
where currents mix and hybrid cultural forms emerge.
Clearly, this is not the place to adjudicate between these two perspectives
even were it possible to do so. The scale and complexity of the issues under
consideration are enough to deter us from simplistic answers. Culture is a key
element in constituting the complex connectivity that drives globalization (see
entry on Culture). One author, Malcolm Waters, goes so far as to argue that
‘‘the globalisation of human society is contingent on the extent to which cultural
relations are effective relative to economic and political arrangements’’ (1995, 9).
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That is, while economic and political exchanges may have become international-
ized, only the symbolic exchanges of the cultural domain are truly globalized.
Cultural products—say, TV programs or CNN news—are intrinsically globaliz-
ing because of the inherent mobility of these cultural forms. Culture in this
sense is truly globalizing and stretches social relations across continents. But
what about culture in the sense of the way we live our daily lives, the frame-
work through which we make sense of our surroundings in this or that geo-
graphical locale?
One of the most interesting concepts to emerge from the global culture
debates is that of glocalization. Originally coined to describe the way in which
the Sony Corporation sought to give local meaning to a global product, this
term has been developed to describe the complex global-local interactions now
prevailing. It is not a question of pitting localism against globalism but of seeing
the complex synergies that exist between them. Globalism and localism are not
cultural polarities, but they are mutually interpenetrating principles. Roland
Robertson derived the term ‘‘glocalization’’ from the Japanese dochakuria, which
refers to ‘‘living on one’s own land’’ (1995, 28). So, for example, the whole ecol-
ogy movement could be understood as a global movement seeking to make life
better ‘‘on one’s own land.’’ Even the McDonald’s gastronomic experience, of-
ten billed as the harbinger of cultural homogenization—the McDonaldization
thesis—is as much local as global. The company is keenly attentive to local die-
tary tastes when it markets its products in different cultural milieus. Thus, ho-
mogenization is always countered by the trend toward heterogenization.
Another critical debate to consider in relation to globalization and culture is
centered around religion (see entry on Religion), fundamentalism (see entry on
Fundamentalism), and the so-called clash of civilizations. It is often forgotten
that the Roman Catholic Church was probably the world’s first truly global
nongovernmental organization. The idea of the world as a single community, as
Robertson writes, ‘‘has a very long history, having been expressed in such
notions as worldwide earthly paradise and the Kingdom of God on earth’’
(1992, 81). Most religions have global aspirations and believe the world’s inhabi-
tants have the potential to become a single community. In some ways, therefore,
the world’s religions can be seen as precursors of globalization as we know it
today. Many religions have underlying aims quite similar to strands of the envi-
ronmental movement. The challenges posed by the complexity and turmoil gen-
erated by globalization are addressed through the call for a global community
that is respectful of local traditions and cultures.
Manuel Castells has written of how ‘‘the age of information becomes the
age of confusion, and thus the age of fundamental affirmation of traditional
values and uncompromising rights’’ (2004, 100). The apparent crisis of the tra-
ditional family, the decline of traditional religions, as well as the rise of new
ones, and the apparently inexorable rise of migration create the specter of
uncertainty. A response to uncertainty and fluidity is to seek answers that
promise certainty and stability. Thus the appeal of absolute values offered by
many religions is the promise of global harmonization. In a global order char-
acterized by increasing strife as well as uncertainty, that such cultural world-
views will gather considerable support is not surprising. In their relationship
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to actually existing globalizations, some religions are fervent supporters, others
make a plea for a more people-friendly approach, and yet others militantly
oppose all it stands for.
As to fundamentalism, if defined as a search for fundamentals (see entry on
Fundamentalism), it could be read as a reaction to globalization and a search
for meaning in an increasingly anonymous and amoral world. The spread of
the free market, of consumerism, and even of a global democratic model can be
unsettling to many. Against such universalizing forces is pitted the sense people
have of community, which opposes the homelessness many may feel in the
global marketplace of consumer goods, the media, or the McDonaldization of
society, for example, as people seek a home. The quest for fundamentals is a
response to the disorientation and loss that any overthrowing of an old order
may create. For Robertson, then, fundamentalism (which usually takes religious
form, though not necessarily) is related to ‘‘the quest for community, for stable
values and beliefs and so on, on the one hand and nostalgia on the other’’
(1992, 178). As a countertrend to the universalizing processes referred to here,
such fundamentalism is perhaps an inevitable product of globalization; it might
even be a function of it.
We are arguing that fundamentalism is an integral element of globalization,
a functionally necessary counter to it while also challenging actually existing
globalization. The search for lost community—only partly captured by the term
‘‘nostalgia’’—is ever-present in periods of accelerated cultural transformation.
Osama Bin Laden’s antiglobalism is but an extreme version of the widespread
desire in Islamic communities to return to an era before Western involvement.
Romantic visions of a golden age of Islam are generated to counter the per-
ceived lack of morality in the West and the temptations of globalism. There are
many other, far less dramatic or newsworthy forms of protectionism. Of course,
as everyone knows, Bin Laden’s implementation of his ideology has been
entirely dependent on globalization in terms of such information and communi-
cation technologies as the Internet and through increased means and, of course,
access to the resources with which to wage asymmetrical warfare. Not all fun-
damentalist movements take such dramatic form, certainly, but it is important
to see to what extent such movements are bound up with the very logic of
globalization.
Samuel Huntingdon has popularized the notion that we are now entering a
post–Cold War era that will be characterized by a clash of civilisations rather
than of political ideologies. Already in 1993, when Huntingdon was director of
the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, he was forecasting that
‘‘a crucial, indeed a central aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the
coming years . . . will be the clash of civilisations’’ (22). This clash basically
boiled down to the interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations
read as cultural blocks. For Huntingdon, the pressures of globalization would
create a cultural backlash and the emergence of fierce conflicts based on a coun-
try’s culture and civilization. From such a worldview, culture and, by extension,
race and ethnicity are the determinants of the fault lines along which the catego-
ries of friend and enemy will be derived in the decades to come. Whereas the
Cold War was fought over differing definitions of freedom and democracy, the
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new culture wars will be fought over who has cultural-racial superiority and
whether this superiority can define the dominant civilization.
Certainly, considerable attention has recently been paid to the rise and fall of
ancient civilizations and the lessons to be learned by Western (or American) civ-
ilization today. Huntingdon himself went on to call on the West to unite ‘‘to
abandon the illusion of universality’’ and for Europe to join America in recog-
nizing that ‘‘Western peoples have far more in common with each other than
they have with Asian, Middle Eastern or African peoples’’ (1996, 43). The clash
of civilizations predicted by Huntingdon (1996) has become a much more plau-
sible scenario in the first decade of the twenty-first century. But does Hunting-
ton’s view actually account for the complexity of the global security we all face?
Can we really speak of the West as if it were a homogenous block? The divi-
sions in the West over the war in Iraq, for example, seem to point against such
homogeneity. Can we really place Russia, China, and what has been called the
Third World into one category deemed non-Western? The arguments presented
in this introduction point against such a binary division of the world.
The immediate post–Cold War period saw support for the notion that we
were moving toward the ‘‘end of history,’’ as Francis Fukuyama so famously
said, with the Western liberal model the only viable path to development (see
entry on Development in volume 1). In practice, as we know, there has been an
increase in all forms of conflict, including frontal challenges to Fukuyama’s
model from the East (China), from the South (in WTO negotiations), and from
various forms of fundamentalism. North America and Western Europe have
seen the rise of xenophobia and the tightening of migration regulations as the
outside world is perceived as ever more threatening. To counterpose against
such realities an idealistic conception of global civil society (see entry on Global
Civil Society) or to expect the emergence of a new global cosmopolitanism to
supersede conflict would be naive. We do need to pursue a more complex
understanding of the current global situations, however, if democratic alterna-
tives for sustainable global governance are to emerge.
CONCLUSION
The economic, political, social, and cultural transformations of the world
around us have one common feature we could arguably name reflexivity.
When referring to ‘‘reflexive modernization,’’ Ulrich Beck sets it in terms of a
‘‘subversive, unintended and unforeseen self-questioning of the bases of politi-
cal life’’ (2000, 101), which is created by the perception of risk that now prevails
after the age of innocence. Rather than living through the ‘‘end of history,’’ as
Fukuyama optimistically predicted at the end of the Cold War, we are moving
into a new era of global civilization where we all have a common destiny, albeit
threatened by old and new forms of global risk, whether from famine to AIDS
or from global terrorism to the perils of genetic engineering. The point is that
the era of globalization is characterized by intense reflexivity as individuals and
institutions reflect on transformation, risks, and how to construct a better future.
This does not spell an era of consensus necessarily; but all bets are off, and the
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rationality of modernity (see entry on Modernity) does not imprison our minds
and lives as it once did.
Globalization cannot explain everything or even anything on its own. The
emergent global risk society, to use Beck’s terminology, is neither unified, nor
all-powerful, nor uncontested (even at the level of meanings). Urry quite cor-
rectly takes to task simplified and static conceptions neglected in statements
that ‘‘ ‘globalization’ is w or alternatively that ‘globalization’ does w’’ (2003, 40).
In reality, nothing is linear about the development of globalization, as if it were
some rerun of the teleological 1950s modernization theories based on an unpro-
blematic expansion of a conception of modernity based on a stylized rendering
of the U.S. experience. While globalization cannot, therefore, be treated as the
subject of history, it can be conceived as a new matrix for global development.
Thus globalization can be taken as a shorthand label for the complex economic,
sociopolitical, and cultural parameters that set the terms of reference and estab-
lish a matrix for the development of human societies.
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